Khalid Amayreh

Hamas thought the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's accession to power would create a dramatic transformation in Gaza, however, they have discovered their Brothers in Cairo have different priorities

When Mohamed Morsi was finally declared the winner in the hotly-contested Egyptian presidential election on 23 June, Hamas's supporters in the Gaza Strip reacted almost euphorically.

Overwhelmed by a feeling of ecstasy, Islamists of all ages paraded the streets, distributing sweets and shouting enthusiastic slogans in support of Egypt's new Islamist president and his (their) mother party, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's legitimate mother.

Many congratulated each others on the "historic Islamist victory," made possible thanks to the Egypt's January 25 Revolution.

The intense excitement was understandable. During the Mubarak era, especially in the final years of the deposed autocratic president's rule, Hamas and its allies suffered immensely as a result of what was perceived as Egyptian collusion with Israel against the Palestinian Islamist movement.

Hamas's indignation at, and estrangement from, the Mubarak regime reached its highest point during the murderous 2008-9 Israeli blitz against the Gaza Strip, during which the Israeli army and air force attempted to destroy Hamas once and for all.

Some Hamas leaders then spoke quite bitterly about the tacit collaboration between the Mubarak regime and the government of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in "clipping the Islamist group's wings," probably in order to enable the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas to reclaim the coastal enclave from Hamas's hands.

This is certainly what many Fatah leaders had hoped would happen then. (Some Fatah activists in the southern West Bank celebrated the Israeli onslaught, which lasted 23 days, by distributing sweats).

When the massive Israeli aggression ended with Hamas still alive and kicking, though badly beaten, the group's leadership became convinced of the existence of a tri-lateral conspiracy against the Islamist movement, with the accomplices being Israel, the Mubarak regime and Fatah.

Hamas knew that Mubarak was trying to complement and perfect the Israeli siege, not only by refusing to open the Rafah border crossing with Gaza but also by building a steel and concrete wall along the border in order to prevent Palestinian infiltration into Egypt through the tunnels.

The fact that the tunnels functioned as a vital though illegal route for supplying the thoroughly tormented Gazans with badly-needed consumer products was not of the concern of the Mubarak regime. Mubarak's main concerns were to obtain a certificate of good conduct from Israel and, therefore, the United States.

Undoubtedly, the Egyptian revolution generated a lot of psychological comfort for most Gazans, especially those with an Islamic orientation. However reality was far from being that simple. Some naïve Islamist leaders took the Egyptian Brotherhood for granted, thinking that the Islamist authorities in Cairo would be at Hamas's beck and call. Others thought the mere fact of Islamists assuming power in Egypt would create a dramatic transformation in the daily life of most Gazans.

Obviously, all these exaggerated hopes proved to be little more than wishful thinking on the part of a frustrated people suffering economic misery as well as the claustrophobia of an unrelenting Israeli blockade.

Then came the Ramadan terrorist attack on an Egyptian garrison near the Rafah border crossing on 5 August, which killed 16 Egyptian soldiers as they were preparing to break their fast.

The incident also shook the Islamist leadership in Gaza, as sporadic reports alleged that at least some of the perpetrators crossed into Egypt via the tunnels.

Hamas condemned the terrorist act in the strongest terms and promised to carry out a thorough and swift search for any possible Palestinian accomplices. The terror attack, which came on the heels of a successful visit by Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniya to Cairo and meeting with President Morsi, was fully exploited by Fatah which accused Hamas of responsibility.

Fatah argued that even if Hamas was not directly involved in the incident, it was still responsible and guilty since "all these extremist groups hatched under Hamas's cloak."

The claim was not exactly correct since most of the nihilistic Takfiri groups preceded and predated the appearance of Hamas in 1988.

Both Hamas and Brotherhood leaders accused Israel of standing behind the murderous attack. They explained that Israel alone stood to benefit from killing the Egyptian soldiers.

When a prominent Islamist leader in Gaza was asked to elaborate on these accusations, he said that it was quite possible that some of the perpetrators were working for the Israeli intelligence, knowingly or unknowingly.

According to reliable sources, the Egyptian leadership was initially in no mood to even hear explanations and justifications, which really caused a lot of distress and mental anguish to the Gaza leadership.

Eventually, Egyptian intelligence reached the conclusion that even if some Gazans were involved in the massacre, it was highly unlikely that Hamas had any pre-knowledge of the terrorists' plans.

Nonetheless, the 5 August terrorist attack and its subsequent ramifications, including the destruction by the Egyptian army of some tunnel openings at the Egyptian side of the borders, did convince many within Hamas not to take their Egyptian brethren for granted.

Palestinian Islamists discovered that the Egyptian Brotherhood had different priorities and even variant agendas, mostly pertaining to the internal Egyptian arena.

Privately, the Egyptian Brotherhood set up three main red lines which they asked Hamas not to cross: absolute non-interference in internal Egyptian affairs, that Hamas should not drag Egypt into a military confrontation with Israel and, finally, that Hamas must make every possible effort to maintain security along the borders.

In return, Hamas wants to benefit from Cairo's moral and diplomatic umbrella. It wants two more things from Egypt under Morsi: first, unfettered movement in both directions of the border at Rafah and, second, a serious Egyptian effort to link Egyptian commitment to the Camp David peace treaty with Israel to the latter's behaviors toward the Palestinians.

The relative coyness of Hamas's expectations vis-à-vis the Egyptian Brotherhood may surprise many. It seems there are influential people within Hamas who are convinced that the Big Brother in Cairo knows better.

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Khalid Amayreh
Occupied Palestine
amayreh2050@yahoo.com
solomonalfred@gmail.com

source: Ahram-on-Line http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/4/53423/Opinion/Hamas--the-Brotherhood-Homogenous-ideology-but-var.aspx