Ismael Haniyeh. Still the Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority! "President
Abbas, in league with Israel and the US, declared a "state of emergency" last June and
illegally dismissed Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and his national unity govern-
ment." (~Stephen Lendman) (AP)

Asia Times

To be fair to Hamas, they were never given the opportunity to succeed. They were sentenced to fail from day one, thanks to an international boycott of Palestine, headed by the US, which refused to deal with the democratically elected representatives of the Palestinians. The boycott resorted a proud people to hunger and need. Hamas at the time was dying for the chance to prove itself - to prove that it could deliver. It was willing to walk that extra mile to earn international recognition and lift the boycott imposed on the Palestinians.

When Hamas came to power in January 2006, trading the bullet for the ballot, many believed the Islamic group - as we knew it - was finished. History after all is riddled with stories of resistance groups that fell from grace the minute they abandoned warfare in favor of government office. The National Bloc of Syria is a good example, accredited with leading the anti-French struggle during the 1930s and early 1940s.

They were voted into power in a landslide victory in 1943, based on their earlier successes, but were ejected six years later in 1949, by a military putsch with little ceremony or respect because they had fallen from grace in the Syrian street.

Government destroys in the Arab world. It blinds and corrupts. It damages - often beyond repair. Every Syrian - by birth - was a member of the National Bloc until its leaders decided to transform it into a political party in 1946. The same applies to Yasser Arafat's Fatah Party before and after Oslo in 1993. It also applies to the Wafd Party in Egypt and more recently, to Hamas in Palestine.

During the years 2000-2006, Hamas obtained all the war medals it needed by steering what has become called the al-Aqsa Intifada. There was no higher reward for the leaders of Hamas than an esteemed reputation in the Islamic world, the ability to inflict pain on Israel, discredit Yasser Arafat, and achieve martyrdom; the ultimate goal of jihadis worldwide. By 2006, it was clear that something was still missing for Hamas. It was the opportunity to rule; the chance to dictate policy and be recognized not only by Arabs and Muslims but by the international community as well.

That, of course, in addition to their conviction that they could run a state, combat corruption and find jobs for the Palestinians. They sincerely believed - and still do - that they can deliver if given the chance. This is actually why they were voted into office in 2006. Palestinians did not vote for them because they promised to annihilate the state of Israel. They actually did not use that during their parliamentary race but rather, campaigned on a social agenda, banking on the bankruptcy of Fatah and the numerous shortcomings that surfaced after the death of Arafat in November 2004. It was a pragmatic victory rather than an ideological one. The Palestinians voted for Hamas because they promised better schools, more security, less bureaucracy and no corruption. Voters included seculars and Christians.

Giving them the full burden of government would have sidelined them from the resistance - the way it did to Fatah after 1993. They would have been too busy cleaning up house in the civil service, inspecting schools, and building roads, to lead a proper resistance. They made several important gestures towards Israel and the Americans, however, crying "Uncle" without actually saying it, because they wanted recognition as statesmen rather than guerilla warriors. Decision-makers in Washington, however, refused to listen, seeing Hamas as no different from al-Qaeda, because of its Islamic program. Instead of taking advantage of the situation, Israel brought Hamas back to the fold of the resistance (what they know how to do best).

When Arafat died in 2004, nobody blamed him for having abandoned the resistance in 1993. Although he spoke of peace, everybody, even the Israelis, knew that he was a man of revolution. But by playing two faces, he managed to run a country. He managed to give the Palestinians wages, jobs, schools and security. This is the game Hamas should play. Khaled Meshal once appeared on al-Jazeera TV and confessed that in early 2004, Hamas officials had in fact sat down to negotiate a truce with US officials. The Americans tried to get them to disarm, and only when Hamas refused did the US allegedly give Israel a green light to assassinate the Hamas founder Ahmad Yassin in March and his successor Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi in April 2004. Then-British foreign secretary Jack Straw also admitted that British diplomats had a dialogue with Hamas.

Looking forward

To be fair to Hamas, they were never given the opportunity to succeed. They were sentenced to fail from day one, thanks to an international boycott of Palestine, headed by the US, which refused to deal with the democratically elected representatives of the Palestinians. The boycott resorted a proud people to hunger and need. Hamas at the time was dying for the chance to prove itself - to prove that it could deliver. It was willing to walk that extra mile to earn international recognition and lift the boycott imposed on the Palestinians.

This was certainly not out of conviction - but helplessness. Had Israel allowed Hamas to take over government, with its full responsibilities, this would have been a win-win scenario for everyone - everyone, that is, except for Mahmud Abbas and Fatah. The Palestinians would have been ruled by the leaders for whom they voted. American "democracy" would have been upheld. Hamas would have been firmly in control of government and Israel would have tamed one of its deadliest enemies. By letting it share power, treating it as a partner, showing it respect, and giving it real duties, Israel could have forced Hamas to share responsibility.

It is very similar to what happened in Iraq after the invasion of 2003. The Americans sidelined the Sunnis for three years, then realized that the keys to security in Iraq, and to ending the insurgency, involved courting the Sunnis and bringing them back to power. By letting them share power, the Americans reasoned, they would also share responsibility for security. They would be obliged, before the voters who voted them into office, to provide the functions of government, including proper security. In the past, Israel refused to negotiate with a government that included Hamas. Now, due to its stubbornness, Israel has to deal with a government in Gaza that is Hamas.

One possible solution to the present confrontation would be to give Hamas the benefit of the doubt, to give them what they are asking for - money, food, medicine and security - then see if they can deliver. That would manage - not end - the conflict between Hamas, Fatah and Israel. That would need a serious mediating effort to restore Gaza to the West Bank and create a cabinet of national unity, under Abbas' authority, to be composed of both Fatah and Hamas members. Collectively, the Islamic party can still boast of a war record in combating Israel, despite all the damage done to its image since it took over Gaza. Fatah - with no Arafat - does not have that luxury anymore. Fatah can provide legitimacy in the international community for Hamas.

Hamas can provide Fatah with allegiance at a grassroot level, in the Palestinian street. Hamas has enough legitimacy - still - to talk and sell peace to the Palestinians and get away with it. Abbas, who nobody sees as a war hero or red-blooded Palestinian nationalist, cannot. He needs Hamas - still - in as much as they need him. Arafat provides the example. In the 1970s, he went to the United Nations and said that he came carrying "an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun", and the world believed him. That was made clear 30 years later, at Oslo in 1993.

The Israelis should have invested in that turning point to achieve their end result with minimum loss and damage to Israel. They could have hollowed out Hamas, emptying it of its very essence, without firing a single shot at the Palestinians. The siege of Gaza, which started last January 2007, has done Israel a great disservice in the international community; almost as painful as the Winograd Commission that came out this week, criticizing the Ehud Olmert government for malpractice during the summer war with Lebanon in 2006. In as strange as it may seem, Olmert needs Hamas in government.

But many things have to be done before this happens. Step one would be to end the siege of Gaza's 1.5 million Palestinians. Step two would be to get Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyya on one table to talk and find an acceptable solution to both Fatah or Hamas. Or, to get both men to step down, for the sake of the Palestinians, for the people to chose new leaders who can deliver security, peace and stability.

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Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

© 2008 Sami Moubayed

SOURCE: http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB02Ak01.html

URL: http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/cgi-bin/blogs/voices.php/2008/02/01/all_power_to_hamas