By James Petras

Introduction

The electoral victory of center left regimes in at least three Latin American countries, and the search for a new ideological identity to justify their rule, led ideologues and the incumbent presidents to embrace the notion that they represent a new 21st century version of socialism (21cs). Prominent writers, academics and regime spokespeople celebrated a totally new variant of socialism, as completely at odds with what they dubbed as the failed 20th century, Soviet-style socialism. The advocates and publicists of 21cs claims of a novel political-economic model rested on what they ascribed as a radical break with both the free market neo-liberal regimes which preceded, and the past “statist” version of socialism embodied by the former Soviet Union as well as China and Cuba.

In this paper we will proceed by examining the variety of critiques put forth by 21cs of both neo-liberalism and 20 century socialism (20cs), the authenticity of their claims of a novelty and originality, and a critical analysis of their actual performance.

The 21cs Critique of Neo-Liberalism

The rise of 21cs regimes grew out of the crises and demise of neo-liberal regimes which pervaded Latin America from the mid 1970’s to the end of the 1990’s. Their demise was hastened by a string of popular uprisings which propelled the ascent of center-left regimes based on their rejection of neo-liberal socio-economic doctrines and promise of basic changes favoring the great majorities. While there are important programmatic differences among the 21cs regimes, they all shared a common critique of six features of neo-liberal policies.

1. They rejected the idea that the market should have precedence and dominance over the state, by which they meant that the logic of capitalist class profit maximization should exclusively shape public policy. The collapse of the market driven capitalism in the recession of 2000 -2002 and mass impoverishment discredited the doctrine of “rational markets” as banks and business bankruptcies skyrocketed, the middle class lost their savings and the streets and plazas filled with unemployed workers and peasants.
2. The 21cs regimes condemned deregulation of the economy which led to the rise of speculators over an above productive capitalism. Under the aegis of neo-liberal rulers regulatory legislation in place since the Great Depression was abrogated and in its place, the policies of capital controls, and financial oversight were suspended in favor of a “self-regulated” regime in which market players established their own rules, thus leading, according to their critics, to speculation, financial swindles and the pillage of public and private treasuries.
3. The predominance of finance over production was the centerpiece of the anti-capitalist discourse of the 21cs regimes. Implicit was a differentiation between ‘bad’ capitalism which earned wealth without producing goods and services over ‘good’ capitalism, which presumably did produce value of social utility.
4. Related to its overall critique of neo-liberalism was a specific critique of the lowering of tariff barriers, the privatization of public enterprises at below their true market value, the denationalization of ownership of strategic resources and the massive growth of inequality.
5. The 21cs argued that neo-liberal regimes surrendered the economic levers of the economy to private and foreign bankers (like the IMF) who imposed deflationary measures instead of reflating the economy through infusions of stale spending. The political leaders of the center-left used this critique of neo-liberalism and the implicit future promise to break decisively with neo-liberal capitalism, without committing themselves to a specific break with capitalism of another variety.

While the center-left critique of neo-liberal capitalism appealed to the popular classes, their rejection of 20cs, was directed at the middle class and to reassure the productive classes (business class) that they would not encroach on private ownership as a whole.

Critique of 20th Century Socialism

In a kind of political balancing act to their opposition to neo-liberalism, 21cs advocates have also put distance to what they dub “twentieth century socialism”. Partly as a political tactic to disarm or neutralize the numerous and powerful critics of past socialist regimes and partly to further claims of a novel, up-to-date variant socialism in tune with the times, the 21cs make the following critique and highlight their differences with 20th century socialism.

1. Past socialism was dominated, by a heavy handed bureaucracy that misallocated resources and stifled innovation and personal choices.
2. The old socialism was profoundly undemocratic both in the way it ruled, the organization of elections and the one part state. The repression of civil rights, and all market activity figures large in the 21cs narrative.
3. The 21cs conflate democracy as a system with the electoral road to power or regime change. Changes of government resulting from armed struggle, especially guerilla movements are condemned, though all three 21cs governments came to power via elections which followed popular upheavals.
4. One of the key arguments put forth by 21cs regimes is that in the past socialists failed to take account of the specifications of each country. Concretely they emphasize differences in racial, ethnic, geographic, cultural, historical traditions, political practices etc. which are now considered in defining 21st cs.
5. Related to the previous point 21cs emphasize the new global configuration of power in the 21st century which shapes the policies and potentialities of 21cs. Among the new factors, they cite the disappearance of the former USSR and China’s conversion to capitalism; the rise and relative decline of a US centered global economy; the rise of Asia, especially China; the emergence of Venezuelan promoted regional initiatives; the rise of ‘center-left’ regimes throughout Latin America; and diversified markets, in Asia, within Latin America the Middle East and elsewhere.
6. The 21cs regimes claim that the “new configuration of society and state” is not a ‘copy’ of any other past or present socialist state. It is almost as if every measure, policy, or institution is the design of the contemporary 21cs regime. Originality or novelty is an argument to enhance the legitimacy of the regime before external and internal critics from the anti-communist Right and to dismiss substantive criticism from the Left.
7. The 21cs regimes make a point of emphasizing the fact that the leadership has no links past or present with Communism and in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador openly reject Marxism both as a tool of analysis or as a bases for policy prescription. The exception is President Chavez whose ideology is a blend of Marxism and nationalism linked to the thought of Simon Bolivar. Both Correa and Morales eschew class divisions, counterpoising a ‘citizen’s revolution’ against a corrupt party oligarchy, in the case of the former, and a culturally oppressed Andean Indian communities against an “European oligarchy”.

Critique of 21st Century Socialist Regimes

While 21cs regimes have more or less clearly stated what they are not and what they reject in the past both on the Left and the Right, and have in general terms stated what they are, their practices, policies and institutional configurations have raised serious doubts about their revolutionary claims, their originality and their capacity to meet the expectations of their popular electorate.

While a number of ideologues, political leaders, and commentators refer to themselves as 21cs, there is a great variety of differences in theory and practice between them. A critical examination of the country experiences will highlight both the differences between the regimes and the validity of their claims of originality.

Venezuela: The Birthplace of 21cs

President Chavez was the first and foremost advocate and practioner of 21cs. Though the following presidents and publicists in Latin America, North America and Europe have jumped on the bandwagon; there is no uniform practice to match the public rhetoric.

In many ways President Chavez’s discourse and the Venezuelan government’s policies define the radical outer limits of 21cs both in terms of its foreign policy challenging Washington’s war policies and in terms of domestic socio-economic reforms. Nevertheless, while there are innovative and novel features to the Venezuelan model of 21cs, there are strong resemblances to previous radical populist – nationalist regimes in Latin America and European welfare state reforms.

The most striking novelty and original feature of Venezuelan versions of 21cs is the strong blend of “historical” Bolivarian nationalism, 20th century Marxism and Latin American populism. President Chavez conception of 21cs is informed and legitimated by his close reading of the writings, speeches and actions of Simon Bolivar, the 19th century founding father of Venezuela independence. Chavez’s conception of a deep rupture with imperial powers, the reliance on mass support against untrustworthy domestic elites capable of selling out the country to defend their privileges is deeply embedded in his readings of the rise and fall of Simon Bolivar. Though Chavez makes no pretext of identifying Bolivar with Marxism, he does make a strong case for the endogenous, national roots, of his ideology and practice. While supporting the Cuban revolution and maintaining a close relation with Fidel Castro, he clearly makes no effort to assimilate or copy the Cuban model even as he adapts to Venezuelan realities certain features of mass organization.

Chavez economic practice includes extensive nationalization and expropriation (with compensation) of large sectors of the petrol industry, selective nationalization of key enterprises based on pragmatic political considerations including capital-labor conflict (steel, cement, telecoms) and in pursuit of greater food security (land reform). His political agenda includes the formation of a mass competitive socialist party within the framework of a multi-party system and the convoking of free and open referendums to secure constitutional reforms. The novelty is found in his encouraging of local self government through the formation of non-sectarian communal councils based in the neighborhoods to bypass the dead hand of an inefficient, hostile and corrupt bureaucracy. Chavez’s goal appears, at times, to be the replacement of ‘representative’ electoral politics run by the professional political class by a system of direct democracy based on self-management, in factories and neighborhoods. In terms of social policy Chavez has funded a plethora of programs designed to raise living standards of 60% of the population that includes the working class, self-employed, poor, peasants and female heads of households. These reforms include universal free medical care and education, up to and including university enrollment. The contracting of over 20,000 Cuban doctors, dentists and technicians and a massive program encompassing the building of clinics, hospitals and mobile units criss-cross the entire countryside, with a priority to low income neighborhoods ignored by previous capitalist regimes and private medical staffers. The Chavez regime has built and financed a large network of publicly run supermarkets that sell food and related household items at subsidized prices to low income families. In foreign policy President Chavez has consistently opposed US wars in the Middle East and South Asia, and the entire rationale for imperial wars embedded in the “War on Terror” doctrine.

Critique: How Novel is Venezuela’s 21cs?

Several questions arise regarding the Venezuelan version of 21cs: (1) Is it really “socialist” or better still does it represent a break with 20 century socialism in all of its variants? (2) What is the ‘balance’ between past and existing capitalist features of the economy and the socialist reforms introduced during the Chavez decade? (3) To what degree have the social changes reduced inequalities and provided greater security for the mass of the people in this transitional period.

Venezuela today is a mixed economy, with the private sector still predominant in the banking, agricultural, commercial, foreign trade sector. Government ownership has grown and national social priorities have dictated the allocation of oil resources. While the mixed economy of Venezuela resembles the early post World War II social democratic configurations in Europe, there is one key difference: the state owns the most lucrative export sector and the principal earner of foreign exchange.

While the government has vastly increased social expenditures comparable or exceeding spending in some of the earlier social democratic governments, it has not reduced the great concentrations of wealth and income of the upper classes, via steep progressive tax rates as in Scandinavia and elsewhere. Inequalities are still far greater than existed under 20th century socialist societies and comparable to existing Latin American societies. Moreover, the upper and upper middle levels of the state bureaucracy especially in the oil and related industries have levels of remuneration which are comparable to their capitalist counterparts, as was the case in nationalized industries in England and France.

Self-management of public enterprises, a relative new idea in Venezuela , has moved beyond the limits of German social democratic co-participation schemes but are confined to less than a half-dozen major enterprises – a far cry from the extensive, nationwide networks found in socialist Yugoslavia between the 1940’s – 1980’s.

The agrarian reform proposals of the Chavez regime though radical in intent and forcibly promoted by President Chavez has failed to change the relationship between farm workers, peasants and large landowners. Where inroads have been made in land distribution, the government bureaucracy has failed to provide the extension services, financing, infrastructure, and security to land reform beneficiaries.

The National Guard has by commission or omission failed to end landlord assassinations of leaders and supporters of land reform by the hired guns of landlords. Over 200 unsolved killing of peasants were on the books by the end of 2009.

While publicists of 21cs have emphasized the government’s nationalizations of oil enterprises from existing owners, they have failed to take account of the growing number of new joint ventures with multi-national corporations from China, Russia, Iran and the European Union. In other words while the role of some US multi-nationals has declined, foreign capital investment in mineral and petrol fields has actually increased especially in the vast Orinoco tar fields. While the shift of investment partners in oil reduces Venezuela’s strategic vulnerability to US pressure, it does not enhance the socialist character of the economy. Joint ventures do add weight to the argument that Venezuela’s mixed public-private economy approximates the social democratic model of the mid 20th century.

The most questionable aspect of Venezuela’s claim to socialism is its continued dependence on a single commodity (oil) for 70% of its export earnings and its dependence on a single market, the United States, an openly hostile and destabilizing trading partner. The Chavez regimes efforts to diversify trading partners has taken on greater urgency with Obama’s military pact with Columbian President Alviro Uribe, to occupy 7 bases. Equally threatening to the mass base of the Chavez road to socialism is the skyrocketing crime rate based on the growth of a lumpen-proletariat and its links to Columbian drug traffickers and civilian and military officials. In many popular barrios the lumpen compete with the leaders of the communal councils for hegemony, using unrest and violence to exercise dominance. The ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Interior and the police and their lack of a close working relation with neighborhood organizations represent a serious weakness in mobilizing civil society and mark a limitation in the effectiveness of the communal council movement.

The remarkable reforms instituted by the Chavez government, and the original synthesis of Bolivarian empancipatory anti-colonialism, with Marxism and anti-imperialism mark a rupture with the predominant neo-liberal practice pervasive in Latin America over the previous quarter century and still operative under numerous contemporary regimes, who claim otherwise.

What is doubtful, however, is whether all the changes amount to a new version of socialism given the predominance of capitalist property relations in strategic sectors of the economy and the continuing class inequalities in both the private and public sector.

Yet one should keep in mind that socialism is not a static concept, but an ongoing process, and the bulk of recent measures are tending to extend popular power in factories and neighborhoods.

Ecuador

In Ecuador, President Correa has adopted the rhetoric of 21cs and it has gained credibility in association with several foreign policy initiatives. These include the termination of US military base lease in Manta; the questioning of parts of the foreign debt incurred by previous regimes; the critique of Columbia’s border incursions and military assault of a clandestine Columbian guerilla camp; his criticism of US free trade policies and support of Venezuela’s regional integration program (ALBA). President Correa has been identified as part of the ‘new wave of leftist Presidents’ by the mass media including the NY Times, The Financial Times and numerous leftist journalists, North and South.

In terms of domestic policy issues, President Correa’s claim to be a founding member of 21cs rests on his critique of the traditional Rightist parties and the oligarchy. In other words, his socialism is defined by what and who he opposes, rather than any social structural changes.

His main domestic achievements revolve around his denunciation of the major electoral parties; his support for and leadership of a ‘citizens movement’, and its success in overthrowing the rightist US backed authoritarian electoral regime of Lucio Gutierrez, the convoking of a constitutional assembly and the writing of a new constitution. These legal and political transformations define the outer limits of Correa’s radicalism and provide the substantive bases for his claim of being a 21cs. While these foreign policy and domestic political changes, especially when taken in the context of increased social expenditures during his first three years of office, warrant his being included as a “center-leftist” they hardly suffice or add up to a socialist agenda especially if they are seen in the large socio-economic structural matrix.

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